

S E C R E T

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December 10, 1959

MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT
Paris, December 19-21, 1959

RECORD OF WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS PREPARATORY
TO A MEETING OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF
FRANCE, GERMANY, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND
THE UNITED STATES

(Revised)

Attached is a revision of page 2 of the Record
of Washington Consultations.

Please make an appropriate substitution of the
attached page.

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The following documents constitute a record of the views expressed during consultations which took place in Washington from November 4 to December 9, 1959 between the Secretary of State and the British, French, and German Ambassadors or their aides on matters relating to summit meetings.

It was understood throughout the discussions that the views expressed did not necessarily reflect governmental policies and in no way involved any governmental commitment.

The record of the consultations is presented in the following order:

Part I - Procedures and Arrangements Relating to an East-West Summit Meeting

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- B. Composition
- C. Stated Purpose
- D. Preparatory Arrangements with the Soviets
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PART I - PROCEDURES AND ARRANGEMENTS RELATING
TO AN EAST-WEST SUMMIT MEETING

A. Timing

The Heads of Government will have to decide upon the date and place of the meeting.

After examining the forward commitments of the Heads of Government of France, the U.K., and the U.S., the U.S. representative proposed that a convenient date would be from April 21-25. Geneva appears to be an appropriate site and informal indication has been received that this would be acceptable in principle to the Swiss authorities. On this basis, a practicable schedule of meetings immediately to precede the East-West summit would seem to be: a) a meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S. at Paris from April 14-18; b) a meeting of these Foreign Ministers with NATO on April 19; and c) a meeting of the four Western Heads of Government at Paris or at Geneva on April 20.

B. Composition

In order to facilitate discussion in a small forum and to maintain the principle of Four-Power responsibility for Germany and Berlin, the East-West summit should be restricted to the Heads of Government of France, the U.K., the U.S., and the U.S.S.R.

C. Stated Purpose of East-West Summit

Bearing in mind the relationship between agenda formulation and the question of participation, it may be considered desirable to state the purpose of an East-West summit meeting in general terms because: a) it would permit the introduction of any topic the Western Powers might consider desirable; b) it would facilitate efforts by the Western side to prevent the development of undue public expectations, thereby averting disillusionment or the growth of public pressure to reach agreements which might prove meaningless; and c) it would help reduce pressures from other nations to participate in the meeting.

It is suggested that the stated purpose of an East-West meeting be: "To consider outstanding international questions of mutual concern."

D. Arrangements with the Soviets

The Heads of Government of France, the U.K., and the U.S. might consider addressing separate but similarly worded messages to

the Chairman

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the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., inviting him to join them for a meeting at the place and date agreed upon. (A sample draft letter is appended as Annex I.)

It would be desirable that in any discussion with the Soviet Government of the subjects to be dealt with at the summit meeting the Western ambassadors should avoid any appearance of wishing to establish what might be considered a formal and agreed agenda. They might be authorized to indicate the subjects which the Western Powers would expect to be discussed, i.e., disarmament, Germany including Berlin, East-West relations, and aid to underdeveloped countries. The Western ambassadors could also make clear the understanding of the Western Powers that all participants would be free to discuss any topic they might wish. In these conversations it would be hoped that the Soviets would indicate what they had in mind as appropriate topics for discussion.

E. Continued Western Consultation

The Heads of Government will wish to consider the form and timing of Western consultations that would be necessary following their meeting of December 19-21. This might involve more than one working group, according to the nature of subjects to be discussed. To facilitate coordination, these consultations probably ought to take place at the same location.

Reports of the Working Group or Groups could be reviewed by the four Western Foreign Ministers at Paris from April 14-18 and subsequently by the four Western Heads of Government at Paris or Geneva on April 20, if these dates are accepted by the Heads of Government.

F. Consultation with NATO

It is considered desirable to consult and exchange views with our NATO partners on matters relating to an East-West summit meeting. Arrangements have already been made for consultation at the December 15-17 NATO Ministerial Meeting and again immediately after the Western summit of December 19-21. There could be similar consultation again immediately before and after the East-West summit conference in April. It would perhaps be useful to send agreed reports covering the deliberations of the Working Group to NATO as developments warrant.

The representative of the United States suggested that consideration be given to having a NATO representative attend Working Group meetings during the intensive period of consultation several weeks prior to the East-West summit. The representatives of the U.K.,

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France, and Germany reserved their positions on this question.

G. Psychological Factors

Recent discussions involving frank exchanges of opinion between representatives of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union have served to clarify positions and to reduce possibilities of miscalculation arising from misunderstandings. Specifically, these exchanges of opinion have led to at least the temporary removal of the element of duress which was implicit in Soviet actions relating to West Berlin in November, 1958.

Experience shows, in connection with recent high-level meetings, that public expectations can be held within manageable bounds if conscious efforts are directed toward this end. This has direct relevance to a summit meeting in that Western governments may, through concerted efforts, avert disillusionment or the growth of public pressures which might work to the disadvantage of the West.

These developments, taken in conjunction with some conciliatory gestures on the part of the Soviets, appear to offer sufficient prospect of serious negotiation with the Soviet Union, despite the lack of any shift in basic Soviet positions, to justify further probing of Soviet intentions at a summit meeting.

Present expectations of a summit meeting appear to be limited to a better and more workable definition of outstanding issues and the firmer establishment of an attitude of reasonableness in order to create the setting for what will be a long process of wearing down and changing the world outlook and long-range intentions of the Soviet leaders, both by negotiation and by other means, and to induce Soviet leaders voluntarily to limit the methods used in pursuing their political aims.

It would seem advisable that consideration be given to practical measures directed toward keeping public expectations in balance and that each government instruct its information services and diplomatic representatives to take appropriate action with respect to this problem. Similar action by all NATO governments would be desirable.

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PART II - SCOPE OF AN EAST-WEST SUMMIT MEETING

A. Soviet Negotiating Intentions

It is generally assumed that it is one of the fundamental precepts of Soviet foreign policy to avoid undertaking unnecessary risks that might endanger the Soviet Union or the rule of the Communist Party itself. Khrushchev has apparently decided to shift tactics and to pursue a policy of detente and gradualism as the best means of achieving Soviet objectives under existing world conditions. Khrushchev has made it clear that he is convinced that the communist economic and social system, soon rather than late, will "bury capitalism" and that this certain victory will best be achieved if there is no disturbance of the Soviet bloc's economic development and if nuclear war is avoided.

Immediate Soviet negotiating aims at an East-West summit appear to be the following:

1. Atmosphere. The Soviets are likely to conduct themselves so as to create an impression of detente.

2. Germany. The peace treaty proposals will no doubt be tabled. Khrushchev presumably expects to come out of the summit with an agreement which does not exclude the possibility of his signing a separate peace treaty with Eastern Germany in the near or foreseeable future.

3. Berlin. While a principal Soviet objective appears to be to achieve an agreement which would open the way to a gradual take-over of Berlin, i.e., by a process of erosion of the Western position, the more immediate goal may be to obtain an agreement which would (a) signify Western acceptance or, at a minimum, acquiescence in the principle that the Western occupation should be ended; (b) point the way to a reduction and ultimate withdrawal of Western forces from Berlin; (c) necessitate increased contacts and acceptance of the East German regime by the Western Powers and increased contacts between East and West Germany on an official level; and (d) increase opportunities for Eastern Germany to undermine West Berlin's economic dependence and ties with the West.

4. General Disarmament. Khrushchev can be expected to use the summit forum to gain as much propaganda mileage as possible out of his disarmament proposals. This does not, however, preclude an interest

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interest in serious negotiations, It is also anticipated that he will attempt to obtain agreement in principle that the newly established Ten-Nation Disarmament Group should work toward a "general and complete disarmament agreement, thus placing Soviet proposals in the forefront of matters to be discussed in the Ten-Nation Group.

5. Partial Disarmament Measures. Aware that an agreement on general and complete disarmament may be impracticable in the foreseeable future, Khrushchev can be expected to express willingness to reach agreements on such partial measures which would work to the advantage of the Soviet Union.

6. Other Items. Other items which Khrushchev might raise are: (a) non-interference in internal affairs, (b) the removal of discriminatory practices relating to trade and the granting of credits, (c) increasing international cultural, technical, and scientific exchanges, and (d) furthering joint scientific projects.

(A paper prepared by the U.S. representative developing the theme of "Probable Soviet Negotiating Intentions" more fully is appended as Annex II.)

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B. Western Items for Discussion

1. Disarmament

In view of the establishment of the ten-nation disarmament group, the membership of which includes the Western governments of Canada, France, Italy, the U.K. and the U.S., the Heads of Government may wish to consider the desirability that further Western quadripartite consultation in preparation for the East-West summit should be restricted to consideration of the manner in which the subject of disarmament could be dealt with at the East-West summit. Discussion of substantive disarmament matters and the coordination of Western positions for forthcoming disarmament negotiations would appear to be within the province of the Western members of the ten-nation group.

a. Procedural Considerations

In view of the presently foreseen schedules, the relationship of the East-West summit negotiations and the general disarmament negotiations presents a major problem for consideration and decision by the Heads of Government.

Two alternative convening dates for the general disarmament negotiations have been suggested:

(1) That the ten-power committee meet after the summit, i.e., about May 15, in the belief that the summit would provide a more dramatic framework for the presentation of any new Western proposals on disarmament and also permit the Heads of Government to establish guidelines and to set priorities for the subsequent detailed deliberations in the ten-nation group; and,

(2) That the ten-power committee meet as early as possible in 1960, before the summit, in the belief that UN and world opinion pressures will not be satisfied with substantial postponement of the convening of the committee in view of the terms of the four-power communique which established the ten-power committee to meet "early in 1960". (The U.S. representative considered that practical considerations would probably preclude the meeting convening before March 15.)

The precise date of the ten-power meeting could be arranged with the USSR through diplomatic channels.

b. Preparation

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b. Preparation for Summit and Ten-Power Negotiations

It seems imperative that the Western Powers should present a united front on the question of disarmament both at the East-West summit and in the ten-power group. The most appropriate procedure to work out a common position would seem to be to set up a working group on which the five Western members of the ten-power group would be represented. Whichever of the two alternatives listed under (a) above is agreed upon, it would seem that such a working group should be convened at the earliest practicable date. An approach to the Canadian and Italians to this end should be decided.

The function of this five-power group would be to coordinate the positions to be taken in the ten-power negotiations and to discuss with and advise the appropriate quadripartite preparatory group on the principles which might guide the West in its discussions of disarmament at the summit.

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2. Germany Including Berlin

The analysis of Soviet tactics at an East-West summit is that Khrushchev will almost certainly place strong emphasis on Soviet peace treaty proposals. He can be expected to argue that these provide the only tenable approach to a solution of the German problem given the factual existence of the two German states. Khrushchev will further contend that the signing of such a peace treaty will automatically end the Allied occupation in Berlin, and all rights deriving therefrom, alleging that West Berlin is rightfully and legally a part of the German Democratic Republic to which it would thus be restored.

Guidance from governments will be required on a number of points to enable useful continuation of work on preparation of the Western position for the East-West summit.

At Annex III is a U.S. paper on Germany including Berlin posing a number of questions which have been suggested for possible consideration by the Heads of Government.

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3. East-West Relations

In a meeting with Khrushchev such as the projected summit, discussion of conflicts between the free and communist worlds is almost inevitable. The themes which Khrushchev will develop will very likely not be greatly different from those he has presented in bilateral meetings with Western Heads of Government. They will undoubtedly include such themes as peaceful coexistence, the changing correlation of forces, non-interference in internal affairs, and liquidation of the "cold war".

It would appear desirable to counter Khrushchev's themes with firm and forceful arguments in order to disabuse him of the impression that a detente between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers can take place merely through improvement in atmosphere rather than through agreement on substantive issues which divide the communist and the free worlds. (Annex IV presents in capsule form a series of themes which recur in Khrushchev's conversations with Westerners.)

Consideration might also be given to the possibility of putting forward appropriate Western proposals.

I.

Annex V sets forth French views on the topic of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

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4. Aid to Underdeveloped Areas

The suggestion has been made that aid to underdeveloped areas might be an appropriate topic to discuss with Mr. Khrushchev during the course of an East-West summit meeting. Annex VI presents French views on this subject.

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SECRETGERMANY INCLUDING BERLINI. The German Question

1. The Western Powers having responsibility for Berlin must, in preparing for an eventual East-West Summit meeting, face the necessity for making a number of decisions. These should involve not only a realistic evaluation of their own position in Berlin but of possible Soviet objectives and of the best response to them in terms of Western objectives and tactics.

2. The assessment of Soviet intentions at an East-West summit is that Khrushchev will almost certainly place strong emphasis on the Soviet peace treaty proposals. He will argue that these provide the only tenable approach to a solution of the German problem given the factual existence of two German states. He will urge that ideally the peace treaty be signed with each of the two Germanies, which would then be encouraged to move towards some form of confederation as a first step towards reunification. This might be linked to some proposal for the immediate creation of an all-German committee along the lines indicated by Gromyko at Geneva last summer. Khrushchev will also probably threaten that, if the West cannot accept this course of action, the Soviet Union will be forced to move ahead unilaterally in signing a peace treaty with the GDR. He will also probably argue that the signing of such a peace treaty will automatically end the Allied occupation in Berlin, and all rights deriving therefrom, alleging that West Berlin is rightfully and legally a part of the GDR to which it would thus be restored.

3. On their part, the Western Powers will almost certainly wish to begin by reaffirming the Western Peace Plan proposed at Geneva on May 14. While there will not be time at the Summit for a long drawn-out debate of the Geneva variety regarding the respective merits of the Peace Plan and the Soviet peace treaty proposals, the Western Powers should be prepared to counter each insistence on the peace treaty by Khrushchev with a repetition of their offer to discuss the Peace Plan, possibly with some modifications, as the only appropriate approach to a solution of the German problem. In this connection they would, of course,

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also emphasize that the only really lasting and satisfactory solution to the Berlin problem can come within the framework of a Plan such as this leading to German reunification.

II. Berlin

4. A relevant question which the Western Powers must decide is whether they are prepared to discuss the Berlin problem in isolation or whether they should insist on discussing it only within the context of a proposal for German reunification. The answer to this will, of course, be partly dependent upon the tactical decision which is taken as to the stress which the Western Powers will wish to place upon the Western Peace Plan. It may be recalled that at Geneva the Western Powers started out by insisting on a Berlin solution within a more general framework, but ended up by discussing Berlin separately with the Soviets.

5. Prior to and during the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference, the Western objective was sometimes described in terms of remedying imperfections in the current Berlin situation and of obtaining certain improvements in that situation. It is a moot point whether the final Western position as advanced at Geneva on July 28, 1959 would have constituted such an improvement. While it would have clarified certain ambiguities in the current situation, it would also have placed certain limitations on Western activities in Berlin and might have provided the USSR with pretexts for attempts at interference with Berlin civil liberties. The element of a specific time limit might also have had unfortunate psychological and practical effects in Berlin.

6. From a strictly theoretical point of view, there are three general approaches which might be taken to the Berlin problem. The first is to maintain that the Allied presence in Berlin must depend upon our rights derived from the defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany. The second is to substitute for Allied rights a newly negotiated quadripartite agreement which would be designed to remain in force until reunification. The third is to present Western proposals on reunification within which a Berlin solution would be comprehended. Under each of the foregoing approaches there are several possible variants. For example, variants of the first were put forward at Geneva.

7. It is obvious

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7. It is obvious from the Western standpoint that there can be no acceptable permanent Berlin solution except within the context of German reunification. No disagreement is possible on this. But however strongly the Western Powers may desire reunification, the possibility must be faced that the Soviets will not permit reunification on terms acceptable to the West until the Soviet Zone has ceased to have major strategic importance for the Soviets, either in itself or in relationship to the entire Satellite area.

8. In choosing between the three broad alternative approaches to the Berlin problem indicated above, the Western Powers must consider not only their present negotiating position but also attempt to assess whether they will be in a relatively better or worse bargaining position after a specific period of years.

III. Berlin at the Summit

9. Allied to these issues is the important question of whether a suitable context of agreement on other subjects can be provided at the Summit so that the Soviet Union will be more amenable to a Berlin solution. The West should, accordingly, have a plan for moving on to other subjects to prevent the breakdown of negotiations over the Berlin issue alone. Such continued discussion, by shifting attention to other topics, might decrease the likelihood that the Soviet Union would take drastic action on Berlin. If, after an impasse had been reached on Berlin, the subject could be put inconspicuously to one side and an atmosphere of reasonableness maintained, the Soviet Union might abstain from and prevent the GDR from initiating provocative actions against West Berlin and Allied access thereto. One diversionary possibility in this connection might be a willingness on the part of the Western Powers to discuss the principles of a peace treaty on a quadripartite basis.

10. In view of the short duration of a summit meeting, the Heads of Governments will presumably limit themselves largely to issuing general directives which would make it possible for Foreign Ministers and their deputies to carry on detailed negotiations. Nevertheless, it may be necessary and desirable with reference to Berlin to attempt to reach agreement on the broad outlines of a specific arrangement. If Mr. Khrushchev is determined

to engage

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to engage in a detailed discussion of the Berlin situation, it will hardly be possible to avoid this. If the context appears favorable, it may indeed be desirable to pin him down on a specific solution which it might be impossible to attain at any other level. It will, of course, be important to avoid giving the appearance that the West is being coerced by the Soviet Union into making greater and greater concessions, and the Western tactical approach will have to be carefully formulated with this consideration in mind.

IV. The Essential Issues

11. Guidance from Governments will be required on a number of points to enable useful continuation of work on preparation for the East-West Summit. The following questions, while not intended to be exhaustive, raise the most important issues or operating assumptions on which agreement must be reached before the Western position can be fully developed:

(a) On the assumption that Khrushchev will begin by reiterating the Soviet peace treaty proposals, should the West respond by putting forward the Western Peace Plan?

(b) If so, can the Peace Plan be modified in any way to make it more negotiable or to demonstrate continued Western sincerity in attempting to achieve German reunification?

(c) Are there circumstances under which it would be advantageous for the Western Powers to offer to discuss the principles of a peace treaty on a quadripartite basis?

(d) Must the Western Powers be prepared at the summit eventually to discuss Berlin outside of the context of German reunification?

(e) If it appears that German reunification is not likely to be achieved within the foreseeable future, are there any reasons why maintenance of the status quo in Berlin cannot be considered a feasible course of action, given the announced Soviet intention to proceed with the signing of a separate peace treaty with the GDR should a modus vivendi not be achieved on Berlin?

(f) Is there any

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(f) Is there any practical way of deterring the Soviet Union from signing such a peace treaty with the GDR: (i) in the absence of a modus vivendi on Berlin; (ii) in the presence of such a modus vivendi; (iii) by the terms of a modus vivendi?

(g) If the Soviet Union does sign such a peace treaty with the GDR in the absence of a modus vivendi on Berlin, what would be the effect of such a treaty on the Western position in Berlin and on the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers relating to Germany?

(h) In view of the known negative Soviet position on reunification, if the discussion at an East-West summit comes to the subject of Berlin alone, (i) should the Western Powers insist on maintenance of the status quo in Berlin until reunification, or (ii) should the Western Powers attempt to move towards such a solution via an interim arrangement of the kind discussed at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, or (iii) should the forthcoming East-West summit be used in an effort to achieve directly an arrangement which would be designed to continue until reunification?

(i) Is the Western negotiating position likely to be stronger or weaker than it is now at the expiration of the period of time envisaged in a Geneva-type interim arrangement?

(j) Can new proposals be developed for an arrangement on Berlin designed to last until reunification which would be acceptable to the West and consistent with its obligations to maintain the freedom of the city?

(k) If an agreement can be achieved with the Soviets designed to be valid until reunification, are the Soviets likely to continue to respect it?

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